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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is respondents' position that plaintiff's Notice of
Appeal in this action was untimely and that the Supreme
Court (and therefore the Utah Court of Appeals, to which
this case was transferred under § 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code
Annotated) has no jurisdiction over the attempted appeal of
the court's summary judgment of dismissal entered on January
30, 1987.
Any jurisdiction in this Court would necessarily be
limited to a consideration of the trial court's denial of
plaintiff's motion for new trial, such jurisdiction deriving
from the Supreme Court's original appellate jurisdiction
under § 78-2-2 (3) (i), Utah Code Annotated, and Rule 4(a),
R. Utah S.Ct.

v

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Opposing parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment.
After

considering

Memoranda

filed

by both

parties upon

positions that there were no material facts in dispute, the
Court granted Defendant's Motion.

Plaintiff then filed a

Motion for a New Trial, which was denied upon the trial
court's conclusion that there was no basis under Rule 59 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to grant a new trial, when
no trial had been held, and upon the further holding that,
in any event, there was no basis under Rule 59 or Rule 60 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the Summary
Judgment granted by the trial court.

The Plaintiff then

filed its Notice of Appeal, appealing the decision of the
trial court denying its Motion for a New Trial.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Defendants submit the following as issues on appeal:
1.

May the Plaintiff properly

seek reversal of a

Summary Judgment by a Motion for a New Trial?
2.

Does an improper Motion for a New Trial extend the

time to file a Notice of Appeal from the entry of a Summary
Judgment?
3.

Should the Plaintiff be allowed to file a Motion

for a New Trial and claim there are disputed facts after the
entry of Summary Judgment when it had conceded there were no
facts in dispute in arguments on the Motion for Summary
1

Judgment?
4.

When the granting of a Summary Judgment is based

on three (3) separate grounds, each of which independently
justifies the judgment, should the judgment be reversed if
one of the grounds is not sustainable on appeal?
5.

Should

Defendant's

bid

Plaintiff
bond

when

be

entitled

Defendant's

to
bid

forfeiture of
contained

an

error, made in good faith, which error was known by the
Plaintiff and immediately brought to Plaintiff's attention
by Defendant upon discovery by Defendant?
6.

Is the Plaintiff entitled to collect money under a

bid bond when Plaintiff has incurred no damages?
7.

Is the Plaintiff entitled to enforce forfeiture of

a bid bond when

it did not comply with the conditions

precedent set forth on the bid and the bond?
STATUTES INVOLVED
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(c) The motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing.
The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount
of damages.
(e)

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
2

made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify
to the matters
stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall
be attached thereto or served therewith.
The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or
opposed
by
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, or further affidavits.
When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.
If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.
Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of ±.he Seventh
Judicial District Court:
(d) The points and authorities in support of a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall refer
with particularity to those portions of the record
upon which movant relies.
(e) The points and authorities in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which the party contends a
genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute shall
be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
refer with particularity to those portions of the
record upon which the opposing party relies, and,
if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence
or sentences of the movant's facts that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the
statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted
for the purpose of summary
judgment unless
specifically controverted by the statement of the
opposing party.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed this action seeking forfeiture of a bid
bond furnished by contractor/principal Ultrasystems Western
Constructors, Inc., (Ultrasystems) and Industrial Indemnity
Company, its surety.

Following discovery, Ultrasystems and

Industrial Indemnity filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
November 10, 1986.

(R. 336, 410, addendum 1)

The Motion

sought a judgment dismissing the Complaint for no cause of
action, on three separate grounds.
Ultrasystems1

bid

was

made

in

(1) That an error in
good

faith,

justified

Ultrasystems withdrawal of its bid, and that equity should
prevent

forfeiture

of

the

bid

bond,

Construction Company, 339 P.2d 421

State

vs.

(Utah 1959);

Union

(2) that

Plaintiff had incurred no damages, Petrovitch vs. City of
Arcadia, 222 P.2d 231 (Cal. 1950); and (3) that Plaintiff
had

in any

event

failed

to

fulfill all the conditions

precedent for the bond to take effect.
Pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the
Seventh Judicial District Court, Ultrasystems submitted a
list of undisputed
entitled

to

judgment

Ultrasystems also
360)

facts upon which the Defendants were
as

filed

a

matter

of

law.

supporting affidavits.

(R.

339)

(R. 355,

At the request of Plaintiff's counsel, Defendants

stipulated in writing to an extension of time to December
10, 1986 for Plaintiff to file any
4

Opposing Memorandum. (R.

413)

On December 10, 1986 Plaintiff filed its Opposing
agreeing that Defendants1

Memorandum

undisputed, but arguing
Summary

Judgment.

Defendants1

that

(R.

Motion

on

list of facts were

Plaintiff

416)

was

Ultrasysterns

December

17, 1986

requested a ruling on the Motions.

entitled

to

responded

to

(R.

434)

and

On December 19, 1986 the

Plaintiff filed an Addendum to its Memorandum in Opposition
(R.

441) ,

followed

by

a

December

Ultrasystems1 Reply Memorandum.

24

(R. 443)

Response

to

On January 15,

1987 the Court, by Minute Entry, granted Defendants1 Motion
for Summary Judgment,
January 30, 1987.

(R. 448) and entered Judgment on

(R. 468 Addendum 2)

Plaintiff responded by a Motion for a New Trial, (R.
479) filed with a Memorandum (R. 471) and Affidavits. (R.
449, 459, 473)

The Court, by Minute Entry, denied the

Motion for New Trial on March 10, 1987 (R. 504 Addendum 3)
and on March 27, 1987 signed the Order denying the Motion
for New Trial.

(R.512, Addendum

4)

On March 18, 1987

Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal of the Court's Minute
Entry of March 10, 1987 denying the Motion for a New Trial.
(R. 511)
The facts underlying the present appeal are summarized
in

the

statement

Ultrasystems'

of

Memorandum

Summary Judgment. (R. 339)

undisputed
in

Support

facts
of

contained
its

Motion

These facts were submitted in
5

in
for

separate numbered sentences and referred to the portions of
the record which supported those facts as required by Rule
2.8(d),

Those

facts, undisputed

by

Plaintiff,

are

as

follows:
1.

Ultrasystems is a construction company involved in

various construction projects throughout the United States.
2.

The Plaintiff, Moon Lake Electric, is a rural

electric cooperative.

(R. 514 Winder deposition page 4,

line 20)
3.
for

In 1985 Moon Lake Electric proposed to construct

Chevron,

Colorado.

electrical

substation

near

Rangely,

That substation is known as the Rooks California

Substation.
4.

an

(R. 515 Hunt deposition pages 3 and 4)

The bidding

and construction of the substation

involved three (3) phases.

The phase which is the subject

of this action was the construction of the superstructure
and above ground facilities.

(R. 515 Hunt deposition page

6)
5.

Ultrasystems

was

not on

the

original

bidders for the erection of the superstructure.
request

of

Mike

Chambers,

a

project

list of
At the

manager

for

Ultrasystems, Ultrasystems was furnished copies of the bid
documents.
6.

(R. 515 Hunt deposition pages 9 and 10)
The bid documents provided to Ultrasystems by Moon

Lake included a letter dated August 27, 1985, blueprints and
6

a document entitled Contractor's Proposal.
page 11.

Hunt deposition

The August 27, 1985 letter and the Contractor's

Proposal are attached as Exhibits "A" and "B" to Allred
Affidavit. (R. 360, 364, 366)
7.

The documentation

was provided

to Mr. Richard

Armstead of Ultrasystems for preparation of the bid.

(R.

355 Armstead Affidavit)
8.

Based

upon

Mr.

Armsteadfs

review

of

the

construction drawings he determined that the conductors, bus
bars and terminals could be connected by various methods,
including

bolting,

coupling

or

welding.

Mr.

Armstead

determined from the documents that it was up to the bidder
as to the type of coupling

to be used.

Mr. Armstead

therefore prepared the bid planning on using bolting and
coupling to make the connections.
is electrical work.

He

is not

Mr. Armsteadfs specialty
familiar

with welding,

particularly aluminum welding and the additional costs and
expense of aluminum welding.
9.

(R. 355 Armstead Affidavit)

Bolting or other methods of connection other than

welding are acceptable methods for connecting conductors,
bus bars and terminals.
Lake

that

the

However, it was the intent of Moon

conductors,

bus

connected using aluminum welding.

bars

and

terminals

be

(R. 515 Hunt deposition

page 38)
10.

The blueprints, except in a few limited instances,
7

do not refer to how the conductors, bus bars and terminals
are to be connected.
materials list.

The reference to welding is in the

(R. 515 Hunt deposition page

37, R. 355

Armstead Affidavit)
11.

Based upon his understanding that the conductors,

bus bars and terminals could be connected by bolting rather
than welding, Mr. Armstead submitted Ultrasystems bid in the
amount

of

TWO

HUNDRED

DOLLARS ($213,300.00).
1985.

THIRTEEN

THOUSAND

THREE

HUNDRED

That bid was submitted September 12,

(R. 355 Armstead Affidavit)

The bid as submitted is

Exhibit "B" to Allred Affidavit. (R. 360, 366)
12.

In addition to Ultrasystems bid, four

bids were received for the substation.
Thiel, TIC, Lamb Engineering and ESS.
down

in

units, being

Units

A

Ultrasystems bid was in Unit A.

(4) other

Those bids were by
The bids were broken

through

0.

The

error

on

The total bid and the bid

on Unit A for the five bidders are as follows:

(Copies of

the bids are attached as Exhibits " O F " of Allred Affidavit
R. 360, 396)
BIDDER

TOTAL BID

UNIT A

Ultrasystems

$213,300.00

$ 51,400.00

Thiel

$314,800.00

$115,315.00

TIC

$396,637.00

$211,677.00

Lamb Engineering

$410,924.00

$169,079.00

ESS

$419,692.00

$204,708.00

8

13.

In addition to the bid, each bidder, pursuant to

the request of the August 27, 1985 letter, furnished a bid
bond.

A copy of Ultrasystems bid bond is Exhibit "G" to the

Allred Affidavit. (R. 360, 405)
14.

The bids were reviewed by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Winder

on September

12 and 13, 1985.

A review of those bids

indicated that Ultrasystems had the apparent low bid.

Mr.

Hunt contacted Ultrasystems with two (2) questions he had
regarding the bid.

One question related to the per unit

cost of control cable in Unit K of the bid and the other
question related to the manner in which the columns had been
filled out in Ultrasystems1 bid.

(R. 515 Hunt deposition

pages 18 and 19)
15.

On

September

19, 1985, Moon

meeting with Ultrasystems.

Lake

scheduled a

The purpose of the meeting was

for Moon Lake to become acquainted with Ultrasystems and its
personnel, to assist Moon Lake in making a determination on
awarding

the bid.

(R.

514 Winder

deposition

pages 16

through 19)
16.

Mr. Hunt was aware that the Ultrasystems bid on

Units A and B was low.

On September 24, 1985, Mr. Hunt

informed Mr. Chambers that Ultrasystems' bid on Units A and
B was very low.

(R. 445 Chambers Affidavit, R. 515 Hunt

deposition pages 24 and 29)
17.

Mr. Chambers relayed that information to Mr.
9

Armstead.

Mr. Armstead then met with other construction

personnel of Ultrasystems to review the bid to determine if
there was a problem.

After

reviewing

the bid, it was

determined that Mr. Armstead had made an error and that Moon
Lake had intended to have the conductors, bus bars and
terminals welded.

The costs of welding is substantially

higher than connecting those items by bolting.

The bid

which had been submitted by Ultrasystems had been kept low
in

an

effort

by

Ultrasystems

Chevron and Moon Lake.

to

establish

itself

with

The cost for aluminum welding would

be an additional SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($75,000.00)
which would cause a substantial loss to Ultrasystems. (R.
355 Armstead Affidavit)
18.

Immediately upon determining the mistake and the

loss which would be caused tc Ultrasystems, a letter was
prepared to Moon Lake stating the mistake and offering to do
the work as bid if Moon Lake would pay the actual costs of
SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($75,000.00) for the aluminum
welding.
19.

Exhibit "I" to Allred Affidavit. (R. 360, 408)
On

September

25,

1985, Mr.

Armstead

and

Mr.

Chambers met with Mr. Hunt and at the meeting Ultrasystems
delivered to Mr. Hunt its letter outlining the mistake in
the bid.

At that time, Mr. Hunt delivered to Mr. Armstead

and Mr. Chambers notice from Moon Lake accepting the bid.
The form, however, stated that the acceptance was subject to
10

the

approval

of

Administration).

the

administrator

(Rural

Electric

(Armstead Affidavit R. 355 Hunt deposition

pages 27 and 20)

Copies of Ultrasystems

letter and Moon

Lake's acceptance are attached as Exhibits "I" and "J" to
Allred Affidavit. (R. 360, 408, 409)
20.
with

On September 26, 1985, Mr. Hunt and Mr. Winder met

other

representatives

of Moon

Lake

and

Chevron

and

determined to award the bid to the next highest bidder and
to

seek

forfeiture

of

Ultrasystems

bid

bond.

(Hunt

deposition page 32)
21.

The next highest bidder, Thiel, was contacted on

September 26, 1985.

Moon Lake agreed to pay Thiel FIFTEEN

THOUSAND DOLLARS ($15,000.00) in addition to the amount bid
by Thiel.

Thiel started work on October 3, 1985.

(Winder

deposition pages 28 and 29)
22.

Moon Lake has a contract with Chevron regarding

the construction of the substation.

That contract provides

that Chevron was to be the owner of the substation and that
Chevron
expenses

was

to

reimburse

incurred

Moon

Lake

in the construction

for

all

of the

costs

and

substation.

Pursuant to that contract, Chevron has paid to Moon Lake the
contract

price

paid

to

FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
to

Moon

Lake

all

Thiel,

including

the

additional

($15,000.00) and Chevron has paid

wages,

costs

and

expenses

including

overhead for Moon Lake employees on the project and has paid
11

Moon Lake for any interest incurred on monies paid by Moon
Lake which was reimbursed by Chevron.
out-of-pocket
Chevron.

costs

(Winder

which

have

deposition

not
pages

Moon Lake has no
been
31

reimbursed
and

33,

by
Hunt

deposition page 33)
23.

Moon Lake has no facts that would show that Mr.

Armstead on behalf of Ultrasystems did not make a good faith
mistake

when

he

submitted

the

bid,

and

that

upon

ascertaining his mistake did not give prompt notice to Moon
Lake.

(Hunt deposition page 39, Winder deposition pages 25

and 30)
24.
that

The bid bond submitted by Ultrasystems provides

neither

principal

nor

surety

is

bound

until

the

contractor, Moon Lake, furnishes evidence that financing
that has been firmly committed to the entire cost of the
project.

No evidence was ever submitted to the Defendants

that financing had been committed for the entire cost of the
project.

(Hunt deposition page 33, Winder deposition pages

31 through 37)
25.

The error on Ultrasystems1 bid was a good faith

mistake, was a result of Mr. Armstead1s lack of expertise
regarding welding and his failure to determine

from the

construction drawings that Moon Lake intended to have the
superstructure

joined

acceptable method.

by

welding

rather

(R. 355 Armstead Affidavit)
12

than

other

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

A Summary Judgment is a final order.

Plaintiff's

Motion for a New Trial was an improper means to seek a
reversal of the Summary Judgment, and did not toll the time
to appeal the Summary Judgment.

As Plaintiff's Notice of

Appeal was filed more than 30 days after entry of the
Summary Judgment, this Court has no jurisdiction and the
appeal should be dismissed.
2.

Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District

Court and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
require a party opposing a Motion for Summary Judgment to
set forth, in writing, specific material facts that are in
dispute.

The Plaintiff admitted the facts relied on by the

Defendants in their Motion for Summary judgment, and in fact
claimed that it was entitled to Summary Judgment, in its
favor, on those same facts.

Only after the trial court

granted Defendant's Motion did the Plaintiff file Affidavits
claiming for the first time that facts were in dispute.
Plaintiff did not, in its Motion for a New Trial nor in its
brief before the trial court, set forth specific disputed
facts,

but

rather

has

made

unsupported

conclusory

allegations.
3.

The trial court granted Defendants' Motion for

Summary

Judgment

on

three

grounds.

Plaintiff now contends that there are facts in
13

(3)

separate,

independent

dispute

on

disputed
court,

of

those

grounds •

Even

if

there

were

facts as to one of the basis relied on by the

the

Judgment

one

remaining

remain

two

(2) reasons

unchallenged,

valid

for
and

granting

the

independently

sufficient for the Judgment.
4.

The purpose

of

a bid

bond

is to protect the

Plaintiff against any damages incurred if the successful
bidder wrongfully withdraws its bid.

Ultrasystems, acting

in good faith, made an honest mistake in its bid, gave
prompt notice of the error
incurred no loss.

to Plaintiff, and

Plaintiff

Plaintiff was reimbursed for all cost of

building the structure and any other costs associated with
Ultrasystems' error, and therefore, has suffered no damages.
Equity and the law of this State do not allow forfeiture
under these circumstances.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS NOT A PROPER METHOD TO
SEEK REVERSAL OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DOES NOT
EXTEND THE TIME PERIOD TO APPEAL THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT,
Plaintiff originally appealed from the trial court's
March 10, 1987 ruling denying Plaintiff's Motion for New
Trial.

(R. 505)

challenge

in

Plaintiff has apparently abandoned that

favor

of

an

argument

against

the court's

granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
did not timely

appeal the Court's decision

Plaintiff

for Summary

Judgment and its present appeal should be restricted to a
question of whether the Motion for New Trial was appropriate
and whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
that Motion.
Rule 58(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
that the trial court may grant a new trial for one of seven
(7) causes listed therein.
ten

The Motion must be filed within

(10) days after entry of the judgment and must be

supported by affidavits setting forth specific facts which
support one of the grounds set forth in Rule 59.

Tangaro

vs. Marrero, 373 P.2d 390 (Utah 1962)
The trial court signed the Summary Judgment on January
30, 1987.

Plaintiff filed its Motion for a New Trial on

February 7, 1987.

On March 10, 1987 the court entered its

ruling denying Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion. (R. 504)
15

The Summary Judgment entered by the trial court on
January 30, 1987 was a final, appealable order.

There is no

provision under either Rule 59 or Rule 5 6 for challenging a
Summary Judgment.

The language of Rule 59 in fact assumes

that a Motion for New Trial follows a trial.

Defendants

have been unable to locate any law in Utah that would
support an argument that one may file a Motion for a New
Trial to challenge the granting of a Summary Judgment.

The

ruling by the trial court that there was no basis under Rule
5 9 for

the granting

of

a Motion

appropriate as a matter of law.

for a New Trial was

It follows that the Motion

did not toll the period for Plaintiff's appeal.
In Burgers vs. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982) the
Supreme Court held that an improper Motion for a New Trial
does not extend the time in which to file a Notice of
Appeal.

Judgment in the instant case was signed and entered

on January 30, 1987.

Plaintiff had 30 days from January 30,

19 87 to appeal the Summary Judgment, and failed to do so.
This Court therefore, has no jurisdiction to consider this
appeal to the extent Plaintiff

seeks a reversal of the

Summary Judgment.
As to the limited issue of the propriety of the Court's
denial of Plaintiff's Motion fo a New Trial, there is no
record basis for the present appeal.
16

POINT II
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RAISE LATE
"ISSUES OF FACT" AFTER INITIALLY ARGUING THAT IT
WAS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE NO
MATERIAL FACTS WERE IN DISPUTE,
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure enables
the trial court to grant judgment as a matter of law when it
is apparent that there
material
offered

fact.

as undisputed, be
at

applicable rule of law.
1983)

and

issue

as to any

Rule 56(e) requires that specific

knowledge, admissible

(Utah

is no genuine

Regan

facts

set forth, based on personal
trial

and

be material

to the

Norton vs. Bl£ckham, 669 P. 2d 857
Outdoor

Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984)

Advertising,

Opinions and conclusions

are not sufficient to create an issue of fact.
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983)

Inc., vs.

Webster vs.

If a party fails to file

opposing affidavits the trial court can conclude that there
is no genuine issue of fact.

Any issues that are raised in

post judgment motions or affidavits which are not timely
filed are raised too late and may not be considered.
Franklin Financial vs. New Empire Development Company, 659
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983)
To assist the trial court in determining whether there
are material issues of fact in dispute, Rule 2.8 of the
Rules of Practice in the Seventh District Court sets forth
the procedure that the parties must follow.

Rule 2.8(d)

requires the moving party, in his statement of points and
17

authorities, to set forth a concise statement of material
facts to which the movant contends no genuine issue exists.
Those facts must be set forth in separate numbered sentences
and refer with particularity to the portion of the record
upon which the moving party relies.
that

any

opposing

memorandum

Rule 2.8(e) requires

raising

an

issue

of

fact

describe the disputed facts in separate numbered sentences,
also referring with particularity to those portions of the
record upon which the opposing party relies.

If a material

fact is not specifically controverted by the opposing party
it is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment.
Ultrasystems complied with Rule 2.8 in its Memorandum
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment which cited
undisputed facts based on specific portions of the record or
supporting
dispute

affidavits.

Plaintiff

any of the Defendants1

opposing memorandum. (R. 416)

did

not

undisputed

specifically
facts

In fact, it admitted

in its
most of

the stated facts, sometimes with unsupported comments, and
simply stated that it could neither admit nor deny others.
Plaintiff did list, at page 7 of its Memorandum (R.
422) three

facts it claimed were disputed.

however, do not dispute number 3.

Defendants,

The other "disputed"

facts were conclusory at best and referred to no support in
the record.

The first item Plaintiff claimed to be disputed

was a claim that Ultrasystems acted in bad faith when it had
18

Richard Armstead prepare the bid.
Armstead,

as

well

as

the

The affidavit of Richard

depositions

of

Plaintiff's

representatives, Mr. Hunt and Mr. Winder, showed there was
no facts to support a claim of bad faith. (R. 355, Hunt
deposition page 39, Winder deposition pages 25 and 30)

In

its response to Defendant, Ultrasystems1, Reply Memorandum,
Plaintiff ultimately agreed that there was no factual issue
when it admitted that the issue of bad faith was a legal
question for the court.
The only other fact Plaintiff contended was in dispute
was a claim that Plaintiff accepted Ultrasystems bid on
September 18, 1985. (R. 422)

When it was pointed out to

Plaintiff that its own agent, in its own documents, showed
that the acceptance occurred September 25, 1985, Plaintiff
made no further claim that that was a disputed fact.

(R.

355, 360, 408, 409 and Hunt deposition page 20, 27)
By its present Brief

(at page

10) Plaintiff still

claims that there is an issue of material fact, yet even as
before the trial court, it fails to state any specific fact
that is in dispute, or give any citation to the record.
Plaintiff relies only upon conclusory and unsubstantiated
allegations that Ultrasystems and its agent, Mr. Armstead,
acted in bad faith in preparing the bid.

Mr. Armstead has

submitted an uncontroverted Affidavit showing that he acted
in good faith and that he made an honest mistake in
19

preparing the bid.

Furthermore, both of Plaintiff's agents,

Mr. Hunt and Mr. Winder, stated in depositions that they
knew of no facts that would

show that Mr. Armstead or

Ultrasystems acted in bad faith, and neither described any
facts

that

contradict

Mr.

Armstead's

Affidavit.

(Hunt

deposition page 29, Winder deposition pages 25 and 30)
When Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was before
the trial court, Plaintiff agreed with the Defendants' list
of undisputed facts and even moved for Summary Judgment on
those same facts.

Plaintiff filed three separate Memoranda

objecting to Defendants' Motion but furnished no affidavits
challenging any of the facts relied on by the Defendants.
Only after the trial court granted Defendants' Motion did
Plaintiff

attempt

to

raise

"issues"

by

"Supplemental

Affidavits" and a Motion and Memorandum for a New Trial.
Only at that late date did Plaintiff claim there were any
issues of fact. None of those claims, even now, are coupled
with any specific facts.
The court determined that Defendants were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the record facts.

There are

no facts in dispute which are material to the issues raised
in the Motion for Summary Judgment.
court should be sustained.

20

The ruling by the trial

POINT III
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED ON ANY
ONE OF THE THREE SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT GROUNDS
RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT,
The

Defendants

sought

summary

judgment

on

three

grounds:
1.

Defendant, Ultrasystems, made an error when it

submitted its bid.

That error was made in good faith,

without gross negligence and, under the law of State vs.
Union Construction Company, 339 P.2d 421 (Utah 1959), equity
should prevent forfeiture of the bid bond.
ground

alone

that Plaintiff, by

(It is on this

continued, unsupported,

conclusory allegations, seeks to raise issues of fact)
2.

The bond was to assure payment of any actual

damages incurred by Plaintiff as a result of a withdrawal of
the bid.

The Plaintiff was fully reimbursed for all costs

incurred as a result of Ultrasystems withdrawal of its bid
and therefore suffered no damages.
Arcadia, 222 P.2d

231

(Cal. 1950)

Petrovich vs. City of
Plaintiff has never

claimed, either to the trial court or on appeal, that there
are issues of fact in dispute on this question.
3.

Plaintiff

failed

to

follow

the

conditions

precedent for the bond to take effect including furnishing
evidence that the financing had been firmly committed to
cover the costs of the project as required by the clear
language of the bond.

Plaintiff has not claimed that there
21

are issues of fact in dispute on this issue.
The trial court, in its ruling, found that Defendants
were entitled to judgment of no cause of action on all three
grounds set forth in the Motion for Summary Judgment.

This

Court can and should sustain the trial court's ruling on any
or all of those grounds.
disputed

facts

is

on

Plaintiff's Motion.

the

The Plaintiff's only claim of
first

ground

alleged

in

the

Even if this Court were to determine

that there were disputed facts that were material to that
issue, this Court should sustain the ruling of the trial
court on either of the other two grounds.
A.
Ultrasystems' Withdrawal of its Bid was a
Result of an Error Made in Good Faith. Plaintiff
was Given Prompt Notice of the Error and Plaintiff
has Suffered No :Loss as a Result of •the Withdrawal
o f •the Bid.
The:refore, the Bid Bond Should Not Be

Forfeited.
In State vs. Union Construction Company, 339 P.2d 421
(Utah

1959) ,

construction

the

of

Defendant

submitted

five miles of road

a

bid

for

in Garfield

the

County.

Defendant also submitted a bid bond deposit of five (5%)
percent.

After

the

bid

was

accepted,

the

Defendant

determined that it had made an error in the exact route of
the roadway and refused to perform.

The mistake was caused

by Defendant's agent relying on old stakes which designated
that the road would go through loose soil rather than a new
survey which placed the road through a great amount of rock.
Defendant determined that it would cost an additional
22

TWENTY-NINE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($29,000.00) to construct the
road on the new survey.

Plaintiff was given notice of the

error two (2) days after the acceptance of the bid.
Court refused

to allow the

forfeiture

The

of the bond and

stated,
Equity will relieve against forfeiture of a bid
bond (a) if the bidder acted in good faith, and
(b) without gross negligence, (c) if he was
reasonably prompt in giving notice of the error in
the bid to the other party, (d) if the bidder will
suffer substantial detriment by forfeiture, and
(e) if the other party's status has not been
greatly changed, and relief from forfeiture will
work no substantial hardship on him. Id. 421
See also, New York vs. John W. Rouse Construction
Company, 274 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1966) (Defendant did not realize
lock gates were to be fabricated in one piece) ; Clinton
County Department of Public Works vs. American Bank and
Trust Company, 268 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. 1978) (Contractor left
out of his bid calculations the restoration process) and
Puget Sound Painters, Inc., vs. Washington, 278 P.2d 302
(Wash.

1954)

(Plaintiff

misunderstood

the

calculations

regarding the length of the bridge towers).
In the present case Ultrasystems meets all of those
elements and is entitled to be relieved from forfeiture of
the bond.

Richard Armstead was the employee who prepared

the

for

bid

Ultrasystems.

His

specialty

involves

construction of electrical facilities of the type required
by Plaintiff.

He prepared the bid planning on using bolting
23

and coupling as the means to connect the conductors, bus
bars and terminals.

Only after the bid was submitted did he

learn that Plaintiff wanted the connections made by aluminum
welding, a more expensive method.
welding

was

reference

in

on

the

the

materials
drawings

The only

list.

used

There

to

reference
was

prepare

no
the

to

such
bid.

(Armstead Affidavit R. 355)
Plaintiff

admits that there

is no evidence

that Mr.

Armstead did not make a mistake and that he did not act in
good

faith.

Plaintiff

rather

contends

that

Ultrasystems

acted in bad faith by having Mr. Armstead prepare the bid.
No facts are cited to support that claim.
There is no question that prompt notice was given to
Plaintiff.

The error was determined September 24, 1985 and

written notice was given to Moon Lake on September 25, 1985.
Likewise, there is no question that Ultrasystems will suffer
a substantial detriment if the bond is forfeited.

Pursuant

to law and the contract between Ultrasystems and Industrial
Indemnity Company, Ultrasystems is ultimately liable for any
payment on the bond.

If the Court allows forfeiture on the

bond as requested by Plaintiff, Ultrasystems will incur a
detriment in the amount of TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
THIRTY DOLLARS ($21,330.00).

Finally, there is no question

that

not

Plaintiff's

status

incurred a hardship.

has

changed

and

it has

In fact, Plaintiff has not been
24

not

damaged at all as a result of the withdrawal of the bid
because it has obtained full reimbursement for all costs
incurred in building the structure, including interest and
any overtime paid to its employees.
Plaintiff also argues that Ultrasystems made a mistake
of law and cites Boise Junior College District vs. Mattefs
Construction Company, 450 P.2d 604 (Id. 1969)

In that case

the Idaho Court refused to forfeit the bid bond when the
facts showed the Defendant forgot to include the cost of
glass in its bid.

State vs. Union Construction Company and

other cases using the same test did not make a distinction
between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law.

Even if that

were the test, the mistake in this case, like that in Boise
Junior College, was a mistake of fact.
Based on the undisputed facts, Ultrasystems meets the
requirements

set

forth

in

State vs. Union

Construction

Company to avoid forfeiture, and was fully entitled to the
court's Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's action.
B.
The Bond Submitted by Ultrasystems is for
Payment of Actual Damages Incurred by Plaintiff
Upon the Withdrawal of Ultrasystems Bid. Since
Plaintiff Incurred No Damages, it is Entitled to
No Relief on the Bond.
The liability of a surety is generally no greater than
that of the principal

Turner vs. Wexler, 538 P. 2d 877

(Wash. 1975) , and the general rule is that a surety is
liable only for payment of actual damages caused by the
25

principal.

Butler vs. Union Pacific Insurance Company, 509

P.2d 1184 (Oregon 1973)
There are two general types of bonds.
or penalty bonds

and

indemnity

bonds.

There are penal
If the bend

is

construed to be a penalty bond, then the face amount of the
bond is forfeited regardless of the amount of damages.

If

the bond is determined to be an indemnity bond, then the
Plaintiff is entitled to recover the actual damages up to
the face amount of the bond.

To avoid unjust forfeitures

and windfalls, most bonds are construed to be indemnity
bonds.
In General Insurance Company of America vs. City of
Colorado

Springs, 638 P.2d

752

(Colo. 1982),

the Court

stated that a bond is to be interpreted according to the
standards governing the construction of contracts in general
and that a determination should be made from the language of
the

instrument

itself,

together

documents such as the contract.

with

any

collateral

The Court further stated

that the determination of the type of a bond is a question
of law.

See also, Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County

vs. Ecology One, 245 S.E.2d 425 (Va. 1978).
The California Court in Petrovich vs. City of Arcadia,
222 P.2d 231 (Cal. 1950) considered a case factually similar
to the present case.

Neither the bid nor the invitation for

bids contained any language declaring that the bond was to
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be forfeited as liquidated damages.

The Court in construing

the bond as an indemnity bond stated:
Forfeitures in the nature of penalty are not
favored; and language must be so construed as to
avoid a forfeiture if that is possible (citations
omitted) ... .In the present case we are of the
opinion that the agreement does not provide for
either a penalty or liquidated damages since the
language in relation to the bid bond contained in
the executed bid form adopts no more than the
words of guarantee in the bid invitation. Words
indicating that the full sum of the bond would be
forfeited or treated as liquidated damages could
readily have been used.
To construe words
actually used otherwise than in accordance with
their plain meaning would result in unauthorized
changes in or additions to the language of the
instruments and would base the conclusion upon
uncertain or doubtful inference contrary to the
language expressly employed. The wording of the
bid invitation and the executed bid was of the
city's own choosing and should not be held to
extend the bidder's and the surety's hazards
beyond its fair meaning. Id. 236
The bond submitted by Ultrasystems is similar to the
bid bond in General Insurance Company of America vs. City of
Colorado Springs and Petrovich vs. City of Arcadia.
language

of

forfeiture.

the bond

contains words

See Addendum 5.

of

The

guarantee, not

If Moon Lake wanted a penalty

bond, it could have so requested in the bid documents.

The

August 27, 1985 letter which accompanied the bid documents
required that a bid bond be furnished, but did not require
that

it be a penalty

bond.

(Addendum

6, paragraph 4).

Furthermore, paragraph 5 does not provide for forfeiture of
the bid bond, but rather provides that it will be enforced
according to its terms.

Some of the bidders did submit a
27

I

penalty bond as a bid bond.

See Thiel bond attached to

Allred Affidavit as Exhibit "H". (R.406)
The law in this State does not support forfeiture and
requires that contracts, such as the bid bond be strictly
construed to avoid forfeitures.

Biesinger vs. Behunin, 584

P.2d 801 (Utah 1978); Jones vs. Thorvaldson, 392 P.2d 483
(Utah 1964)
against

any

Ultrasystems' bid bond indemnified Plaintiff
actual

loss

in

the

event

Ultrasystems

unjustifiably withdrew its bid and refused to perform.
The only damages Moon Lake is entitled to recover under
the indemnity bond are its actual damages.

It is undisputed

that Moon Lake has suffered no actual damages because of its
contract with Chevron, and Chevron is not a party to this
action.
C.
Moon Lake did not Comply with the Conditions
Precedent for the Bid Bond to Take Effect.
Prior to the bid bond taking effect and the surety and
principal being bound thereby, Plaintiff was required not
only to accept Ultrasystems1 bid, but also to comply with
certain conditions precedent set forth on the bond.

The

bond contains the following paragraph:
Provided, however, neither principal not surety
shall be bound hereunder unless obligee prior to
execution of the final contract shall furnish
evidence satisfactory to principal and surety that
financing has been firmly committed to cover the
entire cost of the project. (Addendum 5)
It is undisputed by Plaintiff that no evidence was provided
28

either to the principal or the surety that financing had
been

firmly committed

to cover the entire cost of the

project. (Hunt deposition page 33, Winder deposition pages
25 and 30)
The bid document

further provides that the bid of

Ultrasystems had to be accepted and the contract awarded to
Ultrasystems before the bond would come into effect.

In the

present case, both Plaintiff's acceptance and Ultrasystems1
notice of error and withdrawal of its bid were submitted at
the

same meeting

on

September

25, 1985.

However, the

acceptance of the bid by Plaintiff was conditional.

The

acceptance states:
Subject to the approval of the administrator the
owner hereby accepts the foregoing proposal of the
bidder. (R. 409)
The administrator was the Rural Electric Administration.
Plaintiff admits that it never obtained the approval of the
administrator, but argues that since the administrator's
funds were net involved, its acceptance was not necessary.
That, however, is not
acceptance.

Since

the

the

language
acceptance

of

the

was

conditional
conditional,

Ultrasystems clearly withdrew its bid prior to any final
acceptance of the bid and therefore the bond did not come
into effect.
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CONCLUSION
It
Judgment

is apparent
dismissing

on the foregoing
Plaintiff's

that

the Summary

action, as well

as the

Court's Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, must
withstand Plaintiff's appeal.
appeal

challenges

the Summary

To the extent Plaintiff's
Judgment,

it is clearly

untimely, and the trial court acted fully within prescribed
law and procedure in not allowing a reconsideration of the
Judgment, by "new trial" or otherwise.

Both Order and

Judgment should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted this -^^day of October, 1987.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Respondent
Ultrasystems Western
Constructors, Inc.

^mlQojuJi
l a r k B. Allred

^X\C4A^SJ^KAA^

McKeachnie
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Respondent
Industrial Indemnity
Cqmpany
By:
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r ^W
W#W^
Datfid W. Slau^titer

ADDENDUM

CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendant Ultrasystems Western
Constructors, Inc.
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION,
INC.,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN
CONSTRUCTORS, INC., and
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Cp.vil No. 86-CV-11D

Defendants.

Defendant Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., pursuant
to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure hereby moves the
Court to enter a summary judgment in its favor, dismissing the
Plaintiff's Complaint for no cause of action.
This Motion is brought upon the grounds that there are no
material issues of fact in dispute and based on those facts
Defendants

are entitled

Defendants

are

entitled

to a judgment
to

an

order

as a matter
of

dismissal

of law.
for

the

following reasons:
1.

Defendant, Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., made

a i i error ii 1 submitting i ts 1 Did.

That error was made in good

faith, without gross negligence and Defendant gave prompt notice
of the error.

Pursuant to State vs. Union Construction Co., 339

P.2d 421 (Utah 1959), equity should prevent forfeiture of the bid
bond.
2.

The bond is to guarantee payment of actual damages

incurred by the Plaintiff.

In the present case the Plaintiff

incurred no damages since Chevron reimbursed Plaintiff for all
additional costs caused by Ultrasystems withdrawal of i ts bid.
Petrovich vs. City of Arcadia, 222 P.2d 231 (Cal. 1950).
3.

Plaintiff failed to follow the conditions precedent for

the bond to take effect, including furnishing evidence that the
financing has been firmly committed to cover the costs of the
project

as

required

by

the

bond

and by

failing

•" > accept

Ultrasystems bid prior to notice of the error and withdrawal of
the bid.
The specific grounds, the facts and law in support of this
Motion are set forth more fully in the Memorandum supporting this
Motion.
DATED this jO

day of November, 1986,.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys Apr Defendant Ultrasystems Western
Constry£jK>rs, Inc.

Bv: /

tt^AVijQli)
B. A > l r e d ^

CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendant
Ultrasystems Western
Constructors, Inc.
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION
INC. ,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN
CONSTRUCTORS, INC., and
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Defendant.

Ci^il No. 86-CV-11D

The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to
Motions for Summary Judgment filed by all parties.

Defendant,

Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment claiming that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on three grounds.

Defendant, Industrial Indemnity

Company, joined in that Motion and moved for summary judgment on
the same grounds.

Plaintiff, Moon Lake Electric Association,

Inc., in its Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendants1 Motion
for Summary Judgment also moved for summary judgment.
T h e De f' e ndant s filed 11 i re e a £ f i davits i n suppo rt of i t s
Motion

together

with

accompanying

Memoranda.

The

Plaintiff

submitted

Memoranda

in

Ultrasystems", Memorandum
Judgment

has

set

forth

support

of

its

position.

Defendant,

in Support of its Motion for Summary
undisputed

facts,

which

facts

are

supported by the pleadings, the depositions of Kenneth A. Winder
a n d B r u c e L • H u n t a n d t h e affidavits.

The

P1 a I n t i f £ h a s n o t

submitted any affidavits or other documents showing any dispute
as it relates to those facts.
facts, as

The Court therefore finds that the

listed, are undisputed, that they

are

supported by

admissible evidence on file and that based on those undisputed
facts the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on

the

grounds

Judgment.

set

forth in Ultrasystems' Motion

for Summary

The Court being fully advised, therefore;

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that:
1.
granted

Defendants1
and

Motion

judgment

for

is hereby

Summary

entered

Judgment

dismissing

is

hereby

Plaintiff's

Complaint with prejudice.
2.

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

denied.
DATED this ^O

day of Janpa^y7"T5^7,
Richard C. Davidson
District Judge

2

is

hereby

CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendant
Ultrasystems Western
Constructors, Inc.
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 78«t-4?08
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION,
INC., a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ,

)RDER

Plaintiff,
vs
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN
CONSTRUCTORS, I N C . , and
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY, e t

al.,

Civil No. 86-CV-11D

Defendants.

The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to
Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.

The Court having reviewed

the Motion and the Memoranda filed in support and in opposition
of the Motion and being fully advised and having entered its
Ruling;
TT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial
is denied.
DATED this

day of March, 1987.

v'/T
Dennis Draney
District Judge

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP DUCHESNE COUNTY
'STATE OF UTAH

MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,

R U L I N G

vs
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN CONSTRUCTORS
INC. and INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY et al
Defendants,

C i v i l No.

86-CV-11D

The Court having fully considered the pleadings herein rules
as follows.
The Court finds no basis under Rule 59 U.R.C.P. for granting
a new trial when I n fa< i:!: no trial was held.

Additionally the

Court finds nothing in the record which w<j>uld provide grounds
under Rule 59 or Rule 60 to set aside the Summary Judgment
granted by the previous judge.

The pleadings herein indicate

that all matters now presented by Plaintiff were considered by
Judge Davidson prior to the time he signed the final order.
Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial or to Set
Aside the Summary Judgment is denied.
DATED this Z&^Tday of March, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

?-^^^o

cc:

George E. Mangan
Clark B. Allred
A. Dennis Norton

c^

/l^K^C

Q s Industrial Indemnity

Proposal or Bid Bond

Company
Home Office
Bond No.

YS859-7301

PremiumS

INCLUDED IN BID BO:
SERVICE UNDERTAKING

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT

ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN CONSTRUCTORS,
16845 Von Karman Ave.
Irvine, Ca. 92714

INC.

(hereinafter called the Principal) as Principal, a n d
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY
a corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of _
California
with its principal office at Q r ^ o o , r . ^ i i f n r m ^
, (hereinafter called the Surety),
as Surety, are held and firmly bound unto
MOONLAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC.
188 West 2nd North
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
(hereinafter called the Obligee), in the full and just sum 4>f
TEN PER CENT (10%) OF TOTAL AMOUNT BID
Dollars (S
10%
),
good and lawful money of the United States of America, to the payment of which sum of money well
and truly to be made, the said Principal and Surety bind themselves, their and each of their heirs,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.
WHEREAS, the Principal herein is submitting a proposal for
ROOKS CALIFORNIA SUBSTATION
Location of p r o j e c t Rangely, Colorado
BID DATE:
September 1 2 , 1985
NOW, THEREFORE, if the bid or proposal of said Principal shall be accepted, and the contract
for such work be awarded to the Principal thereupon by the said Obligee, and said Principal shall
enter into a contract for the completion of said work and furnish bonds as required by law, then this
obligation shall be null and void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect

PROVIDED, HOWEVER, neither Principal nor SUrety shall be bound hereunder unless Obligee
urtor to execution of the final contract shall furnish evidence satisfactory to Principal and Surety that
•nancing has been firmly committed to cover the entire cost of the project.

Signed sealed and dated this

11th

day of

September

,19 85

ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN CONSTRUCTORS, INC.

Z££T^>
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY

Principal

4 0 0 N

LAKE

E L E C T R I C ASSOCIATION • PO BOX 278 • 188 WEST 2ND NORTH • ROOSEVELT. UTAH 84066 • PH 722-24J

August 27, 198b

Gentlemen:
Moon Lake Electric Association, Inc. is receiving proposals for
the construction, including all necessary labor, material, and
equipment, of the Rooks California Substation:
1.

Bids should be submitted in writing to our Roosevelt Office
not later than 10:00 a.m. Sept, 1?, 1985,

2.

Proposals must be submitted on the enclosed forms. Bidders
name, address, license number (if a license is required by the.
State), and bid opening date and hour must appear on the
envelope in which the proposal is submitted.

3.

It is the responsibility of the bidder to carefully examine
all aspects of the project including scope of work, drawings
and specifications, site and soil conditions, equipment
required, bonding and contracting requirements, licensing and
regulatory considerations, general local conditions and all
other matters that may affect the cost and completion time of
the project.

4.

Each proposal must be accompanied by a bid bond in an amount
equal to ten percent (10%) of the bid price. Bid bonds of the
bidders submitting the three low proposals will be held until
a proposal is accepted and a satisfactory contractor's bond is
furnished by the successful bidder. Bid bonds of the three
low bidders will be returned within sixty (60) days from the
bid opening date. Bid bonds of the other bidders will be
returned within ten (10) days from the bid opening date.

5.

The successful bidder will be required to execute two (2)
additional counterparts of the proposal and to furnish a
contractor's bond in triplicate in a penal sum not less than
the contract price. Failure of the bidder to execute such
counterparts or to furnish contractor's bond within ten (10)
days after written notification of acceptance of the proposal
by Moon Lake Electric shall entitle Moon Lake Electric to
enforce the bid bond in accordance with its terms.
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6.

Project site is on Chevron Oil property. All contractors and
employees on the site shall be subject to Chevron Oil Company
regulations. (Refer to copy of Safety Specification 3.31).

7.

Interested parties are invited to a pre-bid meeting which will
be held at the main Chevron Oil Company Office at the Chevron
California Site near Rangely, Colorado on September 5, 1985,
at S:00 a.m..

8.

Successful bidder will be notified by September 18, 1985.
Yours truly,
/

Bruce Hunt
Substation Engineer

-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents to George E.
Mangan, 47 North Second East, Roosej^/t, Utah 84066, on this
*\v

day of October, 1987.
C^iafk B". Allred

